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DOES OBJECTIVES-BASED FINANCIAL REGULATION IMPLY A 
RETHINK OF LEGISLATIVELY MANDATED ECONOMIC REGULATION? 
A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Bryane Michael*, Say-Hak Goo**, and Svitlana Osaulenko*** 
 
 
Objectives-based legislation—or laws that focus on achieving particular and 
concrete outcomes—has become a new and important tool that financial sector 
regulators use to tackle large and varied financial system risks.  Yet, objectives-
based legislation—and the frequent principles-based regulation underpinned by 
such legislation—represents a stark departure from traditional ways of legislating.  
In this paper, we describe the problems and prospects of implementing objectives-
based financial regulation—in the form of a Twin Peaks regulatory structure.  A 
focus on the objectives of achieving financial market stability and proper market 
conduct would require a different approach to legislating and regulating in most 
other countries.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A revolution has been occurring in all kinds of government contracting since 
the mid-1980s.  Government bodies have been increasing use of performance-based 
contracts, results-based budgeting, and outcomes-based performance management 
as ways to focus on regulatory outcomes rather than processes.  Nowhere has the 
trend toward outcomes-based regulation been more pronounced than in financial 
sector regulation.  Bank regulators (like the U.K.’s Prudential Regulation Authority) 
focus on risks to the U.K.’s financial markets, whether they come from banks, 
broker-dealers, or insurance companies.  The U.K.’s Financial Services Act of 2012 
looks very different from previous acts in other countries.  The Act defines general 
objectives of the Authority—rather than describing the mechanics of how such an 
Authority would work.  Such a legislative approach represents a watershed change 
in legislative drafting.  Imagine if the Crime Act legislatively required a murder rate 
below 5 per 1000, and set up law enforcement agencies using statutory instruments 
which only defined broad objectives?  Such an example shows the important—and 
controversial—nature of such objectives-based legislation.  
In this paper, we review the literature and data about how objectives-based 
legislation provides a new paradigm for thinking about the way governments create 
and organize regulatory agencies.1  An objectives-based approach to legislation 
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would challenge the fundamentals of legislative and administrative jurisprudence.  
Part I reviews what we know about objectives (or results-based) legislative drafting.  
We describe theories for thinking about the division, and sharing, of competencies 
between regulatory agencies with the aim of tackling particularly large and complex 
regulatory challenges.  Part II describes Twin Peaks regulation as an objectives-
based regulatory approach—giving examples of such regulation for readers not 
particularly well-versed on financial sector regulation.  This Part also describes the 
objectives and circumstances under which a jurisdiction may choose a Twin Peaks 
model.  Finally, Part III will conclude with a brief discussion of the appropriateness 
of objectives-based legislation more generally.  
 
I. GROPING TOWARD OBJECTIVES-BASED LEGISLATION: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A. LEGISLATING GOVERNMENT BODIES FOCUSING ON PARTICULAR 
OUTCOMES 
 
To what extent should legislation define public policy objectives?  
Traditionally, legislative acts have focused on defining rights and obligations of 
various persons and providing the legal basis for the government bodies that police 
the enforcement of these rights and obligations.2  Public policy defines goals, while 
legislation and regulation outline the way the government helps achieve these (often 
changing) policies.3  Legislation—and regulation based on that legislation—
represents the method of putting policy priorities into practice.4  Traditionally, 
legislation designates one administrative body to deal with a specific social 
problem—the police deal with local law enforcement, the health ministry deals with 
hospitals, and so forth.  Yet, many scholars have noticed a significant rethink of the 
traditional role of legislation.  Increasingly complex social problems have required 
 
1 This paper provides the background for a larger study looking at the appropriateness of objective-based 
Twin Peaks financial regulation in and for Hong Kong.  For that larger study, see Bryane Michael et al., Does 
Objectives-Based Financial Regulation Imply a Rethink of Legislatively Mandated Economic Regulation?, 15 
CAP. MKTS. L.J. 115 (2020) (for the first half), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2523346. 
2 We do not have the space to describe the extent to which legislative drafters define the intent of a 
particular bill from the text of the document itself or the way that legislators choose the ambiguity or 
specificity of particular black letter statutory provisions.  The “canonical” view of legislation focuses on law as 
transmitting legislators’ desire for some outcome into the creation of rights and obligations and instructions to 
executive agencies for enforcing/supervising those rights and obligations.  For a recent discussion of the 
issues, see generally John Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419 (2005). 
3 The process, of course, is far more complex than this.  In practice, administrative agencies have great 
latitude in determining legislative intent—and administrative and other courts have latitude in questioning a 
regulator’s interpretation of a statute’s objectives.  For a recent discussion of some of these issues, see 
generally Daniel Gifford, The Emerging Outlines of a Revised Chevron Doctrine: Congressional Intent, 
Judicial Judgment, and Administrative Autonomy, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 783 (2007).  
4 The line between legislation and regulation has become increasingly blurry—with administrative 
agencies often given extremely wide latitude to make laws.  See generally Peter Shane, Separation of Powers 
in American Constitutionalism: The Twenty-Eighth Annual Federalist Society National Student Symposium on 
Law and Public Policy—2009: IV. The Administrative State and the Constitution: Legislative Delegation, the 
Unitary Executive, and the Legitimacy of the Administrative State, 33 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2010).   
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organizational structures that involve overlapping competencies, inter-agency 
cooperation, and a focus on the outcomes (rather than process) of executive action.5 
New approaches to public agency organizational design focus on methods of 
inter-agency cooperation and outcomes rather than processes.  Figure 1 shows the 
major research areas that have grappled with these issues in recent years.  The 
“quality of legislation school” focuses on the mechanics of writing laws—arguing 
that the clarity of drafting and public participation in such drafting can affect 
implementation (and thus the laws’ effectiveness).6  According to this mechanistic 
approach to assigning agency competencies, large social problems can be tackled by 
allocating competencies rationally among existing agencies or by creating a new 
agency.  According to this approach, if a regulatory agency does not deal adequately 
with complex issues (like financial crises), better legal drafting can solve the 
problem.  The “administrative discretion school” might argue that, with loosely 
defined legislation and regulation, administrative agencies can adopt their own rules 
to respond to complex social issues.7  Unlike the “quality of legislation school”, this 
school of authors argues that murkier (less clear) legal drafting provides the best 
way of allowing regulatory agencies to deal with complex social issues.  Because 
public policy objectives change over time, regulatory discretion provides executive 
agencies with the latitude they need to respond to an increasingly complex 
regulatory environment.8  Regulatory interpretation is an ongoing process of 
matching regulations with agency needs to address the problems of society.9  For 
both these schools, sufficiently clearly (or unclearly) legislation and rulemaking can 
resolve any problems in assigning competencies between agencies.  
 
 
 
 
 
5 A variety of scholars have argued that increasingly complex social risks and challenges require a 
rethink of the traditional structure of government.  For a recent take on this long-standing debate, see Donald 
Kettl, Managing Boundaries in American Administration: The Collaboration Imperative, 66 PUB. ADMIN. 
REV. 10, 12–14 (2006).     
6 For a recent example, see Wim Voermans, Concern about the Quality Of EU Legislation: What Kind 
Of Problem, By What Kind Of Standards?, 2 ERASMUS L. REV. 1, (2010).  See also Helen Xanthaki, The 
Problem of Quality in EU Legislation: What on Earth is Really Wrong?, 38 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 651 
(2001).  See also ANN SEIDMAN, ROBERT SEIDMAN, & NALIN ABEYESEKERE, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING FOR 
DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL CHANGE: A MANUAL FOR DRAFTERS (2000). 
7 Like with all the “schools” we describe, our caricature descriptions cannot hope to describe all the 
complexity of the views espoused by the various authors whose work we cite.  For a recent discussion of some 
of these issues, see William West, Administrative Rulemaking: An Old and Emerging Literature, 65 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 655, 655–58 (2005).  For a legal angle, see Cass Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation 
and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885 (2003).  
8 Such an approach has gained proponents among scholars like Stack, who argue that a “purposive 
approach, not a textualist one, best suits the distinctive legal character of regulations.”  See Kevin Stack, 
Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 355 (2012).  Even though rule makers originally wrote very 
specific regulations, new social and administrative values require new interpretations of even specific 
regulations.  Given the need to adapt to ever-changing values and needs, the reader might ask, why not just 
adopt a more objectives-based approach to interpretation?  See id. at 399–400.  
9 Andromachi Georgosouli, Regulatory Interpretation: Conversational or Constructive?, 30 OXF. J. OF 
LEG. STUD. 1, 2 (2010).  
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Figure 1: How to Deal With Complex Social Problems (like Financial 
Crises)?  A Perspective from Several Branches of Literature 
 
Research area Description Critiques 
 
Quality of 
legislation 
(drafting) school 
 
Focuses on the mechanics of 
drafting legislation, focusing 
on clarity and consultation. 
Does not deal with the goal of 
legislative drafting.  
Putting same words in different 
legal system can have adverse 
consequences. 
Administrative 
discretion school 
 
Either de jure or de facto 
administrative discretion 
encourages focus on 
important objectives 
Does not define which 
objectives and subject to abuse 
(capacious and arbitrary 
regulatory behaviour). 
Inter-agency 
Administrative 
Networks in a 
Multi-layered 
Public 
Administrative 
School 
New, complex challenges—
combined with IT 
technologies—allow for 
greater scope of inter-
agency collaboration.  
Often based on models and 
jargon instead of hard data.  
Challenges to inter-agency 
coordination often shown to be 
greater than benefits of such 
collaboration.  Why not just 
make agencies that focus on 
objectives rather than 
processes? 
Inter-agency 
Administrative 
Law School 
Focuses on the legal 
rationale for dividing 
competencies among 
agencies.  Also focuses on 
the politics behind such a 
partition.  Ignores analysis 
of the actual problems these 
agencies try to solve.  
 
“Public Policy 
Implementation” 
School 
Focuses on organisational 
conditions for successfully 
implementing policies.  
Assumes “implementation” of 
legislative objectives, despite 
most not defined in law.  
Performance-
Based Budgeting 
Agencies receive resources 
to the extent they achieve 
particular objectives.  Thus, 
their existence and size 
depends on extent they 
achieve objectives.  
Objectives can change and 
reflect the political priorities of 
the day.  
Financial 
Regulatory 
Reform 
Objectives allow agencies to 
organize themselves in order 
to deal with multi-
disciplinary risks.  
Encourages extreme 
administrative discretion and 
reduces legal certainty.  
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The figure summarises some of the recent literature dealing with the size and scope 
of executive agencies.  We focus on literature dealing with the way that structure 
follows strategy—mapping organization to policy challenges.  
 
Authors writing in “inter-agency public administration school” argue that 
cross-agency collaborations sometimes represent the best approach to tackling large, 
complex regulatory challenges.  Often more positive than normative, authors 
writing in this school explain why inter-agency collaboration has increased—and if 
such inter-agency collaboration represents the best public sector organizational form 
for dealing with complex social problems.  For example, in Hall and O’Toole’s 
study of U.S. legislation between 1965-66 and 1993-94, it was found that inter-
agency work increased over time.10  Roughly eighty-four percent of programs in the 
sixties required multi-agency support.  By the 1990s, that proportion rose to ninety 
percent.  Most studies in this school find that “networked” or “joined up” policy 
implementation must occur—because the objectives of legislation span beyond the 
institutional silos inherited from decades (or centuries) of use.11  Public sector 
managers can overcome the inherent difficulties and ambiguities of inter-agency 
relationships by “managing for results.”12  Such a solution begs the question—why 
not structure administrative agencies around desired outcomes in the first place?13 
Rather pointlessly, authors in the “interagency administrative law school” have 
looked at legal issues surrounding the design and operation of inter-agency 
collaboration.  Most authors in this school describe small issues in administrative 
law, usually arguing why particular administrative decisions may (or may not) 
represent the best outcome for the development of administrative law in general.14  
A “shared regulatory space” (usually some form of collective action problem 
between agencies) requires action by multiple agencies.15  Some authors argue that 
the “best” agency design may not be achievable—as political processes often 
 
10 See Thad Hall & Laurence O’Toole, Structures for Policy Implementation: An Analysis of National 
Legislation, 1965-1966 and 1993-1994, 31 ADMIN. & SOC. 667, 682–84 (2000).  
11 See Robyn Keast et al., Network Structures: Working Differently and Changing Expectations, 64 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 363, 364 (2004).  See also Bob Hudson et al., In Pursuit of Inter-Agency Collaboration in the 
Public Sector: What is the Contribution of Theory and Research?, 1 PUB. MAN REV., 235 (1999).  See also 
Christopher Pollitt, Joined-up Government: A Survey, 1 POL. STUD. REV. 34, 46–47 (2003).  
12 The term ‘managing for results’ represented an important, if vacuous, nostrum—encouraging 
administrators to follow the rules, but also achieve results.  See Stephen Page, Measuring Accountability for 
Results in Interagency Collaboratives, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 591, 591–95 (2004); see also John Bryson, 
Barbara Crosby & Melissa Stone, The Design and Implementation of Cross-Sector Collaborations: 
Propositions from the Literature, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 44, 48 (2006).  
13 Indeed, failures in inter-agency cooperation related to the fight against terrorism and other aspects of 
law enforcement have led to a broader disenchantment with inter-agency collaboration.  See Ashton Carter, 
The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism, 26 INT’L SEC. 5, 7–11 (2002).  The failure of inter-
agency cooperation to prevent and quickly resolve the 2007-08 financial crisis further cast doubts about inter-
agency cooperation as an effective method of dealing with large and serious social risks.  
14 For an overview of many of the issues and authors, see generally Jason Marisam, Interagency 
Administration, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183 (2013). 
15 For a recent take on inter-agency coordination, see Jim Rossi & Jody Freeman, Agency Coordination 
in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1161-73 (2012).  
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determine the structure of agencies and regulators.16  In general, legal schools have 
completely failed to write about how objectives help shape law and the development 
of administrative traditions.17 
Two seemingly unrelated schools of thought have struggled with ways of 
improving the performance of executive agencies when they work in combination 
on complex social problems.  Unique to public administration, authors in the 
“public policy implementation school” look at the extent to which various types of 
executive agency design help promote certain policy outcomes.18  Many 
commentators point to stupidity (for lack of a better word) by policymakers at all 
levels to change government agencies and their processes in order to improve policy 
implementation.19  Cooperation between government agencies—and the outcomes 
of such collaboration—may improve only when agencies tackle complex tasks.20  
Yet, such collaboration needs deliberate design.  The “performance-based budgeting 
school” argues that rule-makers and executive agency creators need not worry too 
much about organizational design—as long as they provide cross-agency incentives 
for executive agencies to maximize performance.  Budgets should allocate resources 
based on social needs, not based on past or requested budgets.  For example, a 
performance-based budget for tackling HIV/AIDS might allocate funds to the 
Ministry of Education, Interior Ministry, local governments, and even Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs (if relevant) to the extent their activities can help achieve a set 
decrease in new infections.21  Such a strategy basically represents an objectives-
based approach to executive agency design.  Budgets set objectives—and agencies 
must work in collaboration in order to receive budget line-item funding.  However, 
such budgeting in such a way does not allow for unpredictability and resource 
overruns.22  Moreover, like with inter-agency collaboration, performance-based 
budgeting has not necessarily resulted in significant improvements in multiple 
agencies’ ability to solve certain social problems.23 
 
16 Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1057–
58 (2011). 
17 Authors writing in the New Comparative Economics perspective represent a refreshing (yet brief) look 
at how economic objectives and incentives shape the development of administrative law and agency design.  
For one of the first comprehensive discussions about how incentives drive legal development, see Simeon 
Djankov et al., The New Comparative Economics, 34 J. COMP. ECON. 1, 4 (2003).  
18 See Jill Schofield, Time for a revival? Public policy implementation: a review of the literature and an 
agenda for future research, 3 INT’L J. OF MAN. REV. 245, 246–47 (2001); see also Harald Saetren, Facts and 
Myths about Research on Public Policy Implementation: Out-of-Fashion, Allegedly Dead, But Still Very Much 
Alive and Relevant, 33 POL’Y. STUD. J. 559 (2005).  
19 For an-oldie-but-goodie taking on this issue, see Benjamin Crosby, Policy Implementation: The 
Organizational Challenge, 24 WORLD DEV. 9 (1996).  
20 See Martin Lundin, When Does Cooperation Improve Public Policy Implementation?, 35 POL. STUD. J. 
629, 629 (2007).   
21 See Matthew Andrews, Performance-Based Budgeting Reform, ANWAR SHAH, FISCAL MANAGEMENT 
(2005).   
22 See Matthew Andrews, Authority, Acceptance, Ability and Performance-Based Budgeting Reforms, 17  
INT’L J. PUB. SEC. MANAGE. 332, 334 (2004).  
23 See generally Jack Yun-Jie Lee & Xiao-Hu Wang, Assessing the Impact of Performance-Based 
Budgeting: A Comparative Analysis across the United States, Taiwan, and China, 69 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 60 
(2009).  For a more general review, see Marc Robinson & James Brumby, Does Performance Budgeting 
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Nowhere has the discussion about organizing public administrative agencies 
gone further than discussion by the “financial regulatory reform school.”24  The 
2008 financial crisis led to wide-spread acceptance that previous regulatory 
structures failed to manage risks inherent in the New Financial Architecture of the 
2000s.25  The lack of regulatory supervision over the financial sector, and 
regulators’ ad hoc response to the crisis showed that existing financial regulatory 
agencies either lacked the authority or ability to engage in necessary financial 
supervision.26  Naturally, policymakers and academics called for a restructuring of 
financial regulators in many financially developed jurisdictions. Both the U.K. and 
U.S. came out with Blueprints for reforming financial regulators like the Financial 
Services Authority (“FSA”) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), 
respectively.27  Both Blueprints came out in favour of objectives-based regulation 
focusing on macro-prudential surveillance and rulemaking, and monitoring of 
market conduct.28  Academics reached pretty much the same conclusion.29  Because 
the U.K. approach to implementing a Twin Peaks approach to financial regulation 
centred around objectives-based legislation, the discussion about Twin Peaks 
regulation and objectives-based regulation often go hand-in-hand.  
 
B. TWIN PEAKS REGULATORY SYSTEMS AND OBJECTIVES-BASED 
LEGISLATION 
 
 
Work?: An Analytical Review of the Empirical Literature 17–30 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper 05/210, 
2005).  
24 For a discussion, see Saule Omarova & Adam Feibelman, Risks, Rules, and Institutions: A Process for 
Reforming Financial Regulation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 881 (2009).   
25 The New Financial Architecture refers to the “globally integrated system of giant bank conglomerates 
and the so-called ‘shadow banking system’ of investment banks, hedge funds and bank-created Special 
Investment Vehicles” that emerged after financial sector deregulation of the 2000s in the US and EU.  See 
James Crotty, Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the ‘New Financial 
Architecture’, 33 CAMB. J. ECON. 563, 564 (2009). 
26 Instead of a proper system of supervision and resolution (saving or winding-up financial institutions in 
times of crisis), US authorities had to engage in “regulation by deals” in order to put in place micro and macro-
prudential measures.  See Steven Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation By Deal: The Government's Response 
To The Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 464 (2009). 
27 See generally HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION: DRAFT SECONDARY 
LEGISLATION (2012), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/191571/con
doc_fin_regulation_draft_secondary_leg.pdf; DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 
BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2008), http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf. 
28 To take one example, the “Treasury believes that a regulatory structure centered on an objectives-
based regulatory framework should represent the optimal structure.” DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 27, at 
143. 
29 Authors like Levine argued for objectives-based legislation creating “an informed, expertly staffed, 
and independent institution that evaluates financial regulation from the public’s perspective.”  Ross Levine, 
The Governance of Financial Regulation: Reform Lessons from the Recent Crisis, 12 INT’L REV. OF FIN. 1, 12 
(2010).  Eddy Wymeersch, after considering the range of institutional structures present across Europe, noted 
that consolidation of regulators seems to be the trend—with objectives-based approaches often preferred.  See 
Eddy Wymeersch, The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: About Single Financial Supervisors, 
Twin Peaks and Multiple Financial Supervisors, 8 EURO. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 2 (2007). 
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Creating and organizing regulators to achieve specific objectives represents 
one (relatively new) way of regulating a financial sector.  Figure 2 shows the major 
approaches to financial regulation—broadly describing each approach and showing 
several countries following that approach.30  Traditionally, regulators have taken an 
institutional or functional approach to financial sector regulation.  Banking laws 
tended to place the authority to oversee banks with the central bank or a separate 
banking regulator.  Securities acts world-wide tended to put a securities regulator in 
charge of capital markets surveillance.31  By the early 2000s, both policymakers and 
academics alike asked if integrating financial sector supervisors could provide 
higher risk-adjusted returns to the national financial sector as a whole.32  The trend 
toward unifying regulators increased—with more countries merging financial 
regulators from sectoral to more integrated structures.  Yet, by the time of the 2007-
08 financial crisis, many countries’ lawmakers realized that a single, integrated 
regulator probably would not provide the best level of regulatory oversight.33  The 
global financial crisis also led to intense debate around objectives-based (rather than 
institutions or services-based) regulators.  Inspired by both policymaker and 
academic support for Twin Peaks financial sector regulation, more countries are 
drafting objectives-based legislation putting a Twin Peaks regulatory framework in 
place.34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 See GROUP OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: APPROACHES AND 
CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 13 (2008), https://group30.org/publications/detail/138. 
31 For a historical cross-country overview of countries’ financial sector regulatory choices (including the 
extent of integration between these regulators), see Jose de Luna-Martinez and Thomas Rose, International 
Survey of Integrated Financial Sector Supervision (The World Bank Fin. Sector Operations and Policy Dep’t, 
Working Paper No. 3096, 2003), http://core.kmi.open.ac.uk/download/pdf/6522027.pdf.  We describe their 
data in detail in a subsequent section.  See infra Part II. 
32 See Martin Cihak & Richard Podpiera, Is One Watchdog Better Than Three? International Experience 
with Integrated Financial Sector Supervision (IMF, Working Paper 06/57, 2006), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp0657.pdf. 
33 Many countries’ changes in financial regulation had the U.K.’s experience well in mind.  The failure 
of the U.K.’s integrated FSA, which inspired other countries to adopt such an approach, led to a groping 
around for “something better.” Joseph J. Norton, Global Financial Sector Reform: The Single Financial 
Regulator Model Based on the United Kingdom FSA Experience—A Critical Reevaluation, 39 INT'L L. 15 
(2005).  Some might argue that the U.K.’s Twin Peaks approach came about from the need to dismantle the 
FSA-approach, more than from its intrinsic qualities.  See Michael W. Taylor, The Road from “Twin Peaks”—
And the Way Back, 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 61 (2010). 
34 Two recent prominent analyses of the suitability of a Twin Peaks regulatory structure concern Canada 
and South Africa.  Pan’s misnamed article essentially assesses the positive features of a financial sector 
regulatory structure, looks at various regulatory structures, and decides on a Twin Peaks model for Canada.  
See Eric Pan, Structural Reform of Financial Regulation, 19 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 796 (2011).  
The South African study basically cajoles the public into adopting a Twin Peaks approach.  See SOUTH 
AFRICA FIN. REGULATORY REFORM STEERING COMM., IMPLEMENTING A TWIN PEAKS MODEL OF FINANCIAL 
REGULATION IN SOUTH AFRICA (2013), http://www.treasury.gov.za/twinpeaks/20131211%20-
%20Item%203%20Roadmap.pdf. 
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Figure 2: Major Approaches to Financial Sector Regulation 
 
Approach Description Country 
Examples 
 
Institutional 
Approach 
A firm’s legal status (for example a 
bank, broker-dealer, or insurance 
company) determines which regulator 
oversees its activity.  
China, Mexico, 
Hong Kong 
Functional 
Approach 
The type of business conducted 
determines which regulator oversees 
that transaction. For example, a bank 
selling securities and insurance products 
may have three different regulators 
overseeing its operations.  
Brazil, France, 
Italy, Spain. 
Integrated 
Approach 
One single regulator oversees all 
financial sector actors. 
Canada, Germany, 
Japan, Qatar, 
Singapore.  
 
Twin Peaks 
Approach 
 
Separates regulators by objective – 
such that one regulator oversees the 
safety and soundness of the financial 
system and the other focuses on the 
conduct of business.  
 
Australia, UK, 
Netherlands 
(possibly South 
Africa in the 
future?) 
Source: summarized from Group of 30 (2008)35. The Country Examples may not 
reflect changes made after 2008.  
 
Twin Peaks financial regulation—and specifically such regulation based in 
objectives-based legislation—provides an interesting development for scholars of 
legislative drafting and jurisprudence for three reasons.  First, most legislation 
regulation does not “put it on the line” by defining specific objectives—and 
therefore outcomes.  Central banks often have had particular objectives (like 
inflation control, encouraging economic growth and regulating banks).36  Securities 
 
35 Supra note 30. 
36 Congress only added the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank’s objectives to the 1913 Federal Reserve Act in 
1977.  See Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 12 U.S.C. § 226 (1913).  That objective requires the Federal Reserve 
to “maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy's long 
run potential to increase production.”  Id. § 226.  Banking regulation does not appear as a primary objective. 
Article 127(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union appears to give the Central European 
Bank regulatory authority to supervise banks almost as an after-thought, as “the [European] Council . . . may . 
. . confer specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings.”  
Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26/10/2012, available 
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT.  Such a conferral requires a 
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regulators also had specific objectives enshrined in legislation.37  However, 
legislation—whether financial or otherwise—has rarely, if ever, explicitly stated 
risks targeted and objectives of legislative action.  Second, legislatively defined 
objectives create objective yardsticks by which to measure executive agencies’ 
success.  A specific objective allows independent analysts to assess versus 
outcomes.38  Such a structure also focuses democratic accountability on executive 
agencies for achieving these clearly-defined legislative objectives.39  Third, less 
prescriptive legislation allows for less prescriptive regulation.  In other words, 
because legislation defines broad objectives (like financial stability), financial 
regulators and other executive agencies can engage more freely in risk-based and 
principles-based regulation.40  Principles-based regulation (as a system—including 
the agency-level rules that focus on risk) clearly represent a new form of 
governance.41  Despite its detractors, principles-based regulation—and the 
objectives-based legislation that underpins such regulation—still represents one of 
the best ways of dealing with complex social and economic problems.42  To the 
extent that a country’s first objectives-based legislation represents a “framework 
law,” that law clearly and unambiguously represents a completely different 
approach to legislation.43  Legislation-by-objectives (even in the form of a financial 
markets act) can create a precedent for future lawmaking-by-objectives.44  
 
special legislative procedure, must be adopted unanimously, and must offer after consulting the European 
Parliament and the European Central Bank itself. Id.  
37 The original U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Act had a section titled Necessity for 
Regulation.  However, the section does not provide explicit objectives per se.  The European Securities and 
Markets Authority probably represents best-in-practice, having a clear statement of objectives to “protect the 
public interest by contributing to the short, medium and long-term stability and effectiveness of the financial 
system, for the Union economy, its citizens and businesses.”  See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78a (1934).  The objective includes regulatory and supervisory objectives, objectives for ensuring the 
integrity, transparency, efficiency and orderly functioning of financial markets, proper regulation and 
supervision of the taking of regulatory risks, and enhancing customer protection.  Id.; see also Establishing a 
European Supervisory Authority Regulation, OJ L 331 Reg. 1095/2010 (2010), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32010R1095. 
38 Such a legislative approach in some ways enshrined the same principles that the U.K. introduced at the 
regulatory level through its Citizens Charter policy.  As a Prime Ministerial policy, the U.K.’s Citizens Charter 
policy required U.K. public agencies to agree on service performance targets and report on these.  See Bruce 
Doern, The U.K. Citizen's Charter: Origins and Implementation in Three Agencies, 21 POL. & POLITICS 1 
(1993).  For the problems that the initiative encountered, see also Mary Bowerman, Auditing Performance 
Indicators: The Role of the Audit Commission in the Citizen's Charter Initiative, 11 FIN. ACCOUNTABILITY & 
MGMT. 2 (1995).      
39 For a discussion on the case of prudential regulation, see Julia Black, Managing Regulatory Risks and 
Defining the Parameters of Blame: A Focus on the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, 28 L. & 
POLICY 1 (2006).  
40 Legislation which defines very specific obligations on regulators and financial institutions leaves very 
little room for such regulators and institutions to develop their own methods of addressing the risk the statute 
targets.  See Cristie L. Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the Global Financial 
Crisis, MCGILL L. J. 55, (2010), http://works.bepress.com/cristie_ford/2/. 
41 See Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation, 45 
AMER. BUS. L. J. 1 (2008).  
42 For a review of the issues (including the arguments against), see Julia Black, The Rise, Fall and Fate 
of Principles Based Regulation, (LSE LAW, SOCIETY AND ECONOMY WORKING PAPER 17/2010, 2010), 
http://works.bepress.com/cristie_ford/2/. 
43 Scholars have recently described laws that change the way the legislature makes laws, “framework 
laws.” Such framework laws impose obligations on future legislative members to pass laws in particular 
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Yet, such objectives-based financial sector legislation and regulation is not 
without its critics.  Jones, for example, might argue that lawmakers should not 
design financial regulators around financial market risks, institutions, and actors.45  
To make the argument less abstract (and to paraphrase Jones to the breaking point), 
the United States SEC should not just sit back and figure out how to apply rules to 
JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, AIG, and other financial sector actors as they are.  The 
SEC, Federal Reserve, and other regulators should not react to financial markets.  
They should shape them—requiring Goldman Sachs to break up, for example, at 
their pleasure.  Government should drive markets—not the other way around.  Yet, 
Von Nessen, almost as if responding to the Jonesian challenge, argues that 
government diktat has caused large difficulties in the adoption of Australia’s Twin 
Peaks legislation.46  Australian financial firms have had large difficulties accepting 
and adapting their rules and compliance systems to Twin Peaks regulators 
requirements down under.  White warns that integrated regulatory approaches—like 
Twin Peaks—provide financial regulators and central banks with too much 
discretionary authority.47  For his part, Pan argues that the approach adopted for 
financial sector regulation (and the organisational structure of financial regulators) 
does not matter very much.48  Instead, the resources available and grant of legal 
authorities to engage in effective regulation represents the most important part of 
successful financial sector regulation.  Even if regulatory approaches—like the 
U.K.’s integrated model or its subsequent Twin Peaks model—represent the best 
model for the U.K., nothing guarantees that such an approach will work when 
exported.49  
Yet, who could deny that Twin Peaks regulation based on objectives-centered 
legislation (for better or worse) represents a new approach to lawmaking?  
Proponents like Bakir mistakenly claim that Twin Peaks regulation serves as a way 
of creating inter-agency collaboration through “steering and coordinating policy 
networks . . . [and] governance through hierarchy in the financial services.”50  These 
proponents argue that inter-agency collaboration still represents a challenge.51  
 
formats.  See Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation (USC Law School, USC Pub. Policy 
Research Paper No. 04-3, 2004).  
44 Why does most U.K. financial law focus so heavily on objectives, whereas other countries do not?  
Some may argue in the U.K. that mental legislative entrenchment has affected such objectives-based thinking.  
Once legislatures start thinking and using new concepts (like cost-benefit analysis, impact assessment, 
objectives-based-legislation and so forth) later bills reflect these trends.  See Oona Hathaway, Path 
Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 
601 (2003).  
45 See Renee Jones, Back to Basics: Why Financial Regulatory Overhaul is Overrated, 4 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 391 (2010).  
46 See Paul Von Nessen, Financial Services Reform: What Can be Learned from the Australian 
Experience, J. S. AFR. L. 64 (2006). 
47 See Lawrence White, The Rule of Law or the Rule of Central Bankers?, 30 CATO J. 3 (2010).  
48 See Eric Pan, Four Challenges to Financial Regulatory Reform, 55 VILL. L. REV. 743 (2010). 
49 See Joseph J. Norton, Global Financial Sector Reform: The Single Financial Regulator Model Based 
on the United Kingdom FSA Experience—A Critical Reevaluation, 39 INT’L LAWYER 1 (2005).  
50 Canir Bakir, The Governance of Financial Regulatory Reform: The Australian Experience, 87 PUB. 
ADMIN. 4 (2009).  
51 See Adriane Fresh and Martin Baily, What does international experience tell us about regulatory 
consolidation? (Pew Fin. Reform Project, Briefing Paper 6, 2009), 
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Other analysts put Twin Peaks regulation—sometimes with or sometimes without 
objectives-based regulation—head-to-head with other regulatory models in a menu 
fashion.52  Regardless of whether Twin Peaks regulation represents a new regulatory 
model or not, objectives-based regulation does.  Objectives-based legislation—and 
the objectives-based regulation that give it force—represents a new way of thinking 
about all kinds of legislation, not just in the financial sector.  
 
II. WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT TWIN PEAKS FINANCIAL REGULATION AND 
THE OBJECTIVES-BASED LEGISLATION THAT PUTS IT IN PLACE? 
  
A. TWIN PEAKS AS THE NEXT STEP OF REGULATORY INTEGRATION? 
 
Financial regulators worldwide have struggled to find a regulatory structure 
which fulfils the objectives of promoting financial stability and protecting 
customers.53  Such a search has resulted in changes (sometimes several) to financial 
sector regulatory structure since the 2000s. Figure 3 shows the number of 
financially sophisticated countries who changed their financial regulatory structure 
in the 2000s (and the number of changes).54  The impetus for financial sector 
regulatory reform began well before the 2007-08 crisis—with regulators 
recognizing that previous structures did not adequately generate macro and micro-
prudential regulation nor protect customers adequately—while still encouraging 
financial sector innovation and growth.  Except for a jump in 2002, both the number 
of countries adopting changes and the number of reforms, have remained relatively 
constant throughout the decade.  However, we cannot judge from this data the 
extent to which these reforms focus on aligning regulations with particular 
objectives.  
 
 
 
 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCcQFjA
A&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.brookings.edu%2Fresearch%2Freports%2F2009%2F09%2F21-consolidation-
baily&ei=pPxsU_iLNaiKywPKhoCoAw&usg=AFQjCNEvMCt2AuJfDpTRDZxe_d9iPlaIxg&bvm=bv. 
52 Taylor represents one of the many authors who compares Twin Peaks side-by-side with other 
approaches.  To his unending credit, he represents one of the only authors to actually classify “regulation by 
objective” as a separate system.  See CHARLES TAYLOR, CHOOSING FINANCIAL REGULATORY AGENCY 
MANDATES, PEW FIN. REF. PROJ. WORKING PAPER 6 (2009), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-
/media/assets/2009/07/20/0013.pdf. 
53 Financial sector regulators’ objective may vary from country to country, yet they all agree on the 
basics of stable financial markets and protecting customers.  For a fuller description of how various Twin 
Peaks regulatory model objectives converge on these ultimate outcomes, see Jeroen Kremers and Dirk 
Schoenmaker, Twin Peaks: Experiences in the Netherlands (LSE FIN. MKTS. GRP., WORKING PAPER 196, 
2010), http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/assets/documents/papers/special-papers/SP196.pdf. 
54 See Richard Herring & Jacopo Carmassi, The Structure of Cross-Sector Financial Supervision, 17 FIN. 
MKT., INST. & INSTRUMENTS 56, 58 (2008); Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn. Regulating the 
Regulators: The Changing Face of Financial Supervision Architectures Before and After the Crisis, in 
HANDBOOK OF CENTRAL BANKING, FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION AFTER THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS (2009). 
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Figure 3: Countries Started Consolidating their Regulators 
Even Before the Financial Crisis
numberof reforms in 
supervisory architectures
increase in number of countries
adopting a unif ied regulatory model
The figure show s the number of countries adopting changes in their f inancial regulatory architecture per year.
Sources: Herring and Carmassi (2008) for increase in the number of countries adopting a unif ied regulatory model 
and Masciandaro and Quintyn (2009) for data on number of reforms in supervisory architecture. 
Yet, the trend toward integrating financial regulators suggests a regulatory 
focus on objectives rather than financial institutions themselves.  Figures 4a and 4b 
show the nature of changes in financial sector regulation among a range of 
countries.55  As shown in Figure 4a, sectoral supervision—the kind Hong Kong has 
used—decreased dramatically over the decade from forty-five percent of the 
countries Melecky and Podpiera studied—to thirty-four percent.56  Financial 
legislation worldwide has integrated competencies for prudential supervision over 
the decade—mostly with a central bank (or to a lesser extent, a financial services 
authority).  Integration of prudential supervisory functions in central banks, like 
Hong Kong’s Monetary Authority, has not necessarily been the preferred method 
for a variety of countries.  Furthermore, as shown in Figure 4b, the trend toward 
integrating business (market) conduct competencies has also increased.  Only a 
handful of countries have adopted Twin Peaks style integration (assigning market 
conduct to a separate agency).  Yet, the trend toward looking at business conduct at 
all has surged—from fifty percent of countries putting in place such a system of 
oversight—to sixty-two percent by 2010.  
 
 
 
 
 
55 Martin Melecky & Anca Podpiera, INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES OF FINANCIAL SECTOR SUPERVISION, 
THEIR DRIVERS AND EMERGING BENCHMARK MODELS, at 33–-35 (MPRA, 2012), https://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/37059/1/MPRA_paper_37059.pdf. 
56 Hong Kong follows a functional approach in the Group of 30 and other academics’ taxonomy.  Using 
the Melecky and Podpiera taxonomy, Hong Kong employs a sectorally-based system of financial regulation.  
While the words differ, the underlying concept remains the same.  Hong Kong regulates financial institutions 
according to their legal form and (to a limited extent) the services they provide.  
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Figure 4b: Integrated Business Conduct Regulatory Structures Continued
to Gain Popularity throughout the 2000s
The figure show s organisational arrangements for the prudential supervision of f inancial institutions in a range of "high 
f inancial depth" economies studied by the authors from 1999 to 2010. Please see the original source for the definitions of 
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Figure 4a: Integrated Macroprudential Regulators The Norm -- with Countries
Using Sectoral Supervisors on the Fall 
Sectoral supervision
The figure show s organisational arrangements for the prudential supervision of f inancial institutions in a range of "high f inancial 
depth" economies studied by the authors from 1999 to 2010. Please see the original source for the definitions of each type of 
regulatory structure and criteria for assigning changes in prudential regulatory supervisory structures. 
Source: Melecky and Podpiera (2012). 
Unsurprisingly, integration among regulated entities has encouraged 
integration of their regulators.  A number of factors contribute to the benefits of 
integration exceeding the costs among financial regulators, including: more cross-
border financial transactions, economies of scale in regulation, computerization, and 
conglomeration of financial organizations.57  Bureaucratic politics can also play an 
 
57 Luna-Martinez and Rose provide one of the first thorough analyses of such factors.  In their 
comprehensive econometric study of factors influencing the extent of financial regulator integration, Melecky 
and Podpiera find that GDP per capita, population trade-to-GDP ratios, central bank autonomy, number of 
previous economic crises, stock market capitalization and private credit to deposit ratios have statistically 
significant relationships with the integration of prudential supervision.  Business conduct integration is 
statistically significant in correlation to GDP per capita, trade-to-GDP ratios, credit-to-GDP ratios, and banks’ 
net interest margins.  JOSE DE LUNA-MARTINEZ & THOMAS ROSE, FIN. SECTOR OPERATIONS AND POLICY 
DEP’T, INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF INTEGRATED FINANCIAL SECTOR SUPERVISION (2003), 
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6522027.pdf; MELECKY & PODPIERA, supra note 55. 
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important role.58  Relative “bargaining power” between regulators and the regulated 
can also play a role.59  Kremers and co-authors in particular have argued that the 
presence of financial conglomerates in the Netherlands has militated for an 
integrated regulatory structure.60  Figure 5 illustrates the forces encouraging the 
integration of financial regulators and the need for objectives-based regulation.  In 
the U.S., acquisitions by financial firms outside of their sub-sector constituted about 
eighteen percent of the value of all transactions.  In the EU, such acquisitions (by 
value) came to about twenty-five percent of all mergers and acquisitions between 
1990 and 2006.  Many financial service providers offer banking, insurance, and 
securities simultaneously.  In such a market environment, dividing regulators by 
function makes less and less sense.  
 
Figure 5: Increased Financial Integration Militates for Integrated 
Regulators 
  Target 
   US   EU-27  
  banks insurance securities banks insurance  securities 
 
 banks 52% <1% 7% 54% 1% 5% 
acquirer insurance 2% 12% <1% <1% 13% <1% 
 securities 5% 3% 18% 14% 3% 8% 
The figure shows the value of mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. and EU financial 
services sectors from 1990-2006. Acquisitions outside of each sector came to about 
18% for the U.S. and 25% for the EU.  
Source: Herring and Carmassi (2008).61 
 
What does the data say about the effectiveness of financial regulator 
integration in achieving particular objectives like encouraging compliance with 
macroprudential regulation and protecting customers?  At first glance, such 
integration produces mixed results (to say the least).  Figure 6 provides some of the 
first evidence about the effectiveness of regulator integration on compliance with 
prudential and market conduct standards established by the International Monetary 
Fund (“IMF”).62  Integrated supervision has a statistically significant correlation 
with compliance with Basel Core Principles.63  However, it doesn’t correlate with 
 
58 See, e.g., Donato Masciandaro, Divide et Impera: Financial Supervision Unification and Central Bank 
Fragmentation Effect, 23 EURO. J. OF POL. ECON. 2 (2007). 
59 See generally, Donato Masciandaro, Politicians and Financial Supervision Unification Outside the 
Central Bank: Why Do They Do It?, 5 J. OF FIN. STABILITY. 2 (2009). 
60 Jeroen Kremers et al., Cross-Sector Supervision: Which Model?, in.BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPER ON 
FIN. SERV.: 2003, 225, 230-31 (2002). 
61 Supra note 54. 
62 Martin Cihak & Richard Podpiera, IS ONE WATCHDOG BETTER THAN THREE? INTERNATIONAL 
EXPERIENCE WITH INTEGRATED FINANCIAL SECTOR SUPERVISION, (IMF, 2006), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp0657.pdf. 
63 The Basel Core Principles represent advice promulgated to regulators in 2012, dealing with reducing 
bank and banking system risk. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR 
EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION, (2012), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf.  
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much else.  Instead, factors like overall regulatory environment and level of 
economic development matter far more.  Interestingly, the extent of integration does 
not affect the number of regulatory staff monitoring financial institutions.   
 
Figure 6: At First Glance, Data on Integrated Financial Supervision 
Mixed at Best 
 
Effect of Integrated 
Supervision on... 
Effect? Reason Reference 
Compliance with Basel 
Core Principles 
Yes A higher proportion of 
countries with 
integrated supervisors 
had higher levels of 
compliance with the 
Basel Principles 
 
Figure 3 
Regulatory governance in 
banking and securities 
markets? 
No Regression analysis 
shows no statistically 
significant effect for 
having an integrated 
regulator. 
 
Table 6 
Prudential frameworks in 
banking and securities 
markets? 
 
No Same Table 6 
Regulatory PRACTICES in 
banking and securities 
markets? 
 
No Same Table 6 
Financial integrity and 
safety nets in banking and 
securities markets? 
 
No Same Table 6 
Compliance with 
International Standards 
 
No Same Table 7 
Does the overall regulatory 
environment matter? 
Yes Having an integrated 
regulator matters far 
less for Basel Principle 
compliance when 
taking regulatory 
environment into 
account 
 
Table 4 
Does level of economic 
matter? 
Yes Having an integrated 
regulator matters far 
Table 4 
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less for Basel Principle 
compliance when 
taking GDP per capita 
into account 
 
Number of regulatory staff 
in government 
No Regression analysis 
shows no statistically 
significant effect for 
having an integrated 
regulator. 
Table 8 
 Source: Cihak and Podpiera (2006).  
 
Some trends in the data suggest that regulator integration may lead to better 
macro-prudential policymaking and market conduct.  The data needs far more 
analysis than the illustrative graphs we have put together.  However, these 
illustrative graphs (shown as Figures 7a and 7b) suggest that regulator integration 
may help financial regulators achieve their objectives.64  Figure 7a shows a positive 
relationship between integration of financial regulators and decreases in risk premia 
associated with a country’s investments.65  Figure 7b shows a positive relationship 
between integration of a country’s financial regulators and rule of law (as a possible 
proxy for the extent to which financial firms engage in illegal activity).66  These 
relationships do not control for macroeconomic factors or even control for potential 
outliers.  However, further analysis could confirm that integration among countries’ 
financial regulators has positive macro-prudential regulatory and market conduct 
impacts—such results would provide support for further integration worldwide.  A 
Twin Peaks regulatory structure would certainly represent one of the more 
integrated regulatory models considered by lawmakers in these countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 The reader should see these graphs as only illustrative.  We compared the organization of financial 
sector supervision with the banking crises internationally.  We found that countries which changed their 
prudential supervision organizational structures had a forty-three percent average output loss as a result of 
banking crises (with our results unadjusted for country size).  In contrast, countries without any change in their 
prudential supervisory structures had an unweighted output loss as a result of banking crisis of only thirty-two 
percent.  To repeat our analysis, see generally MARTIN MELECKY & ANCA PODPIERA, ORGANIZATION OF 
FINANCIAL SECTOR SUPERVISION DATASET (2012); see also, LUC LAEVEN AND FABIAN VALENCIA, SYSTEMIC 
BANKING CRISES DATABASE: AN UPDATE (IMF, 2012), 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Systemic-Banking-Crises-Database-An-Update-
26015. 
65 See Donato Masciandaro, Marc Quintyn & Michael Taylor, Inside and Outside the Central Bank: 
Independence and Accountability in Financial Supervision, 24 EURO. J. POL. ECON. 4 (2008). WORLD BANK, 
DATABANK,  https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FR.INR.RISK?end=2014&start=1960&view=chart.   
66See WORLD BANK, WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS (2014), 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home.  For Masciandaro and co-authors, see supra note 65.  
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Figure 7b: Integrated Regulators Promote Better Market Conduct?
The figure show s the relationship betw een the degree of integration of f inancial regulators compared w ith rule of law  
scores (as one of the World Bank's Worldw ide Governance Indicators) in a range of countries. The level of economic 
development does not cause omitted variable bias in this f igure. See originals for definitions of concentration of 
f inancial regulators and rule of law . The extent to w hich rule of law  proxies market misconduct is very much an open 
question. 
Sources: Masciandaro and Quintyn (2009) for data on f inancial regulator concentration and World Bank (2014) for 
data on rule of law .  
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Figure 7a: Countries with Integrated Regulators Have Lower Risk Premia -- Suggesting 
Better Macroprudential Policies
The figure show s the relationship betw een the degree of integration of f inancial regulators compared w ith risk premia 
in various countries' f inancial markets (compared w ith the local lending rates minus T-bill rates) in a range of countries. 
Level of economic development does not cause omitted variable bias in this f igure. See original for definition of 
concentration of f inancial regulators. 
Sources: Masciandaro and Quintyn (2009) for data on f inancial regulator concentration and World Bank (2014) for 
data on risk premia. 
Financial regulator integration also seems to improve these regulators’ 
independence and accountability—making them more likely to achieve their 
objectives.  Figure 8 shows the change in scores of financial regulators’ 
independence and accountability after a change in regulatory structure.67  Bird—
talking specifically about the accountability of Australia’s Twin Peaks regulators—
finds the accountability arrangements covering the country’s Prudential Regulatory 
Authority and Securities and Investments Commission adequate.68  Masciandaro 
 
67 See MARC QUINTYN et al., THE FEAR OF FREEDOM: POLITICIANS AND THE INDEPENDENCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY OF FINANCIAL SECTOR SUPERVISORS 42 (IMF, 2007), 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/The-Fear-of-Freedom-Politicians-and-the-
Independence-and-Accountability-of-Financial-Sector-20155. 
68 Joanna Bird, Regulating the Regulators: Accountability of Australian Regulators, 35 MELB. U.L. REV. 
739, 755 (2011). 
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Figure 8: Financial Sector Regulators World-Wide More Independent and 
Accountable After Reform
The figure show s the extent to w hich accountability and independence of various countries' f inancial regulators changes
after f inancial regulatory reform expressed as a percent of a benchmark given by the authors -- according to survey data. 
Countries like Turkey and Mexico improved the most. Japan and Estonia backpeddled. 
Source: Quintyn and co-authors (2007)
Turkey for
example improved 
on both measures 
and co-authors find this effect increases when the prudential regulator sits outside of 
the central bank.69  Integration, particularly outside the central bank, correlates with 
greater financial stability (namely fewer systemic banking crises).70  
 
 
Many authors have reviewed the pros and cons of using a principles-based 
financial sector regulatory approach as opposed to a rules-based financial sector 
regulatory approach.71  These authors miss the point.  Legislators should not simply 
balance pros and cons of principles versus rules from a priori principles.  Instead, 
they should match regulatory structure to regulatory environment.  In other terms, 
structure should follow strategy.72  Melecky and Podpiera, among others, find a 
strong relationship between the structure of financial sector regulators and various 
macroeconomic and financial sector variables.  As we have previously mentioned, 
some of these factors include GDP per capita, population trade-to-GDP ratios, 
extent of central bank autonomy, number of previous banking crises, stock market 
capitalization, credit-to-GDP ratios, and banks’ net interest margins.73  The question 
isn’t whether countries like Hong Kong should have a sectoral basis of financial 
 
69 Such a finding holds particular relevance for jurisdictions like Hong Kong, where the central bank has 
always played a pivotal and undisputed role in establishing macro-prudential regulations.  See Donato 
Masciandaro, Marc Quintyn & Michael Taylor, Inside and Outside the Central Bank: Independence and 
Accountability in Financial Supervision, 24 EURO. J. POL. ECON. 4 (2008).  
70 See generally BARRY EICHENGREEN & NERGIZ DINCER, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, WHO 
SHOULD SUPERVISE? THE STRUCTURE OF BANK SUPERVISION AND THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM (2011), https://www.nber.org/papers/w17401. 
71 For a recent description in the financial regulation context, see John Coffee & Hillary Sale, 
Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea, 95 VA. L. REV. 707 (2009); see also Richard 
Abrams & Michael Taylor, ISSUES IN THE UNIFICATION OF FINANCIAL SECTOR SUPERVISION (IMF, 2000). 
72 The question about whether public sector organizational design adapts to the broader organizational 
environment remains an open one.  For an empirical analysis of the extent to which government agency size 
and specialization (structure) responds to the macroeconomic environment, see BRYANE MICHAEL & MAJA 
POPOV, PUB. ORG. REVIEW, THE SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT (2010), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1740842. 
73 See Melecky, supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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regulation as opposed to a Twin Peaks one.  Instead, countries like Hong Kong 
should choose the regulatory approach most appropriate for their financial markets 
(as measured by a range of macroeconomic and other variables).  
 
As the economic crisis already illustrated, some countries’ lawmakers can 
make incorrect decisions about the structure of the country’s financial regulators.  
Figures 9a and 9b show the extent of the over or under integration of several 
countries’ financial regulators.74  Some prudential regulators—like the U.K.’s and 
Korea’s—have over-integrated (compared with other countries with similar levels 
of GDP-per-capita and other factors).  Other countries’ prudential regulators—like 
Hong Kong’s, Canada’s, and Mexico’s—have under-integrated.  Similarly, 
regulators focusing on financial sector business conduct have over-integrated in 
Singapore and Germany.  Such regulators have under-integrated in Hong Kong and 
Switzerland.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 The authors ran regression analysis on the extent of financial sector regulatory integration and a range 
of variables for most of the world’s economies.  Such regression would show which countries have higher (or 
lower) levels of regulator integration compared with other countries that have similar levels of GDP-per-capita 
and other factors.  Any judgment about over or under integration would thus assume that the average or 
normal level of integration for any chosen level of GDP-per-capita (and other factors) represents the right 
level.  Naturally, such value judgments should be taken with scepticism. For figures’ source, see supra note 
55.  
  
 Journal of Legislation                  265 
 
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
Singapore Korea Germany UK Denmark Hong Kong USA Switzerland
Ex
te
nt
 o
f R
eg
ul
at
or
y 
O
ve
r-
in
te
gr
at
io
n
(n
eg
at
iv
e 
m
ea
ns
 
un
de
r-
in
te
gr
at
ed
)
Figure 9b: Hong Kong's Financial Sector Regulators Monitoring Business 
Conduct Also Under-Integrated
The figure show s the degree of over-integration of each country's BUSINESS CONDUCT financial regulators - as 
predicted by a range of factors w hich should determine the optimal extent of regulator integration. We subtracted actual 
integration scores w ith f itted values (predicted by regression analysis) and assumed that differences betw een actuals 
and predicted scores represent over-regulator (if  the resulting difference is positive) or under-regulation (if the regulating 
difference is negative).
Source: Melecky and Podpiera (2012)
 
Financial sector regulatory integration does not need to correlate with 
objectives-based financial legislation.  However, the two trends have coincided over 
the years.  Larger financial regulators need to define objectives (outcomes) rather 
than specific activities to regulate.  Regulator size provides economies of scope and 
scale in overseeing a range of financial sector activities.75  Larger financial sector 
risks have also militated a focus on specific types of risks—rather than simply 
focusing on processes of regulated entities.  With increasing leverage, larger sizes, 
and more international exposure, financial entities pose systemic risks unknown 
even twenty years ago.76  Thus, larger and more integrated financial regulators 
would usually do well to focus on objectives.  
 
B. LEGISLATING TWIN PEAKS REGULATORY STRUCTURES THROUGH 
OBJECTIVES-BASED LEGISLATION 
 
A number of jurisdictions have adopted a twin-peaks regulatory structure (or 
other similar structure).  In the U.K., a review of regulators’ response to the 
financial crisis has led the Government to adopt a Twin Peaks structure.77  
According to recent surveys, “79% of firms believe the changes to the regulatory 
system will result in improved effectiveness, which can be expected to contribute to 
promoting the UK as a global hub for the financial sector.”78  Regarding Australia’s 
 
75 See Abrams, supra note 71. 
76 We do not have space to describe these risks in this paper.  Interestingly, authors like Allen and Gale 
note that inappropriate financial regulation may have actually contributed to systemic and other risks (like 
counterparty risks).  See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Systemic Risk and Regulation, THE RISKS OF 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 341 (University of Chicago Press, 2007).  
77 See Alison Lui, Single or Twin? The UK Financial Regulatory Landscape After the Financial Crisis of 
2007–2009, 13 J. OF BANK. REG. 24 (2012).  
78 Michelle Carrol & Michael McKee, BDO & DLA PIPER, THE NEW TWIN PEAKS MODEL 8 (2012), 
https://www.bdo.co.uk/getattachment/bb4e11fe-2767-40b2-b548-cfed3f40a4ee/attachment.aspx. 
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twin peaks system, Professor Brown echoes the many voices in the literature that 
have argued that Australia’s twin peaks regulatory model helped it during the 
crisis.79  “The evidence from this examination suggests that Australia was able to 
avoid many of the problems that arose in the United States and the United Kingdom 
… partly due to its twin peaks regulatory structure.”80  The Dutch experience with 
Twin Peaks regulation shows that such a regulatory structure helped the Netherlands 
weather the global financial crisis.81  South Africa’s consultation on its upcoming 
Twin Peaks reforms also points to the promise of such regulation.82  Given its 
promise, the EU is considering adopting a twin-peaks approach in its Union-wide 
surveillance and monitoring actions.83  As previously mentioned, the US Treasury 
and General Accountability Office have already come out in favour of an 
objectives-based Twin Peaks approach for the USA.84  
A Twin Peaks approach to financial sector regulation does not strictly require 
objectives-based legislation.  Indeed, the legislation setting up Australia’s Twin 
Peaks approach to financial sector regulation focuses on setting up the organizations 
sitting on each of the Peaks and defining their activities.  The Australian 1998 
Prudential Regulation Authority Act provides no objectives at all.85  The Act notes 
that “the [Australian Prudential Regulation Authority] exists . . . [for] regulating 
bodies in the financial sector in accordance with other laws of the Commonwealth 
that provide for prudential regulation or for retirement income standards, 
administering the financial claims schemes . . . and developing the administrative 
practices and procedures to be applied in performing that regulatory role and 
 
79 See Elizabeth Brown, A Comparison of the Handling of the Financial Crisis in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Australia, 55 VILLANOVA L. REV. 509 (2010).  
80 Elizabeth Brown, A Comparison of the Handling of the Financial Crisis in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Australia, 55 VILLANOVA L. REV. 509 (2010), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1864898.  
81 Like with all regulatory approaches, the Netherlands’s Twin Peaks model had good as well as bad 
aspects.  For an illuminating discussion of the Dutch experience (and succinct recommendations for improving 
the Dutch version), see MONETARY AND CAPITAL MKT. DEP’T., TECHNICAL NOTE ON FINANCIAL SECTOR 
SUPERVISION: THE TWIN PEAKS MODEL, (IMF, 2011), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr11208.pdf.  
82 The Financial Sector Regulation Bill looks a lot like the UK’s implementing legislation—with a focus 
on objectives.  See NAT’L TREASURY, FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION BILL (2013), 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/twinpeaks/20131211%20-
%20Item%201%20Financial%20Sector%20Regulation%20Bill.pdf. 
83 The EU currently follows a sectoral approach for Union-wide surveillance.  However, several 
politicians and senior advisors have started militating for a Twin Peaks approach.  For an overview of the EU 
system of financial regulation, see Eddy Wymeersch, The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: About 
Single Financial Supervisors, Twin Peaks and Multiple Financial Supervisors, 8 EURO. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 2, 
(2007).  For one example of a senior EU legislator arguing for a Twin Peaks approach, see Pervenche Beres, 
First Step Towards 'Twin Peaks' Model of Financial Supervision, BANKING TODAY, Mar.–Apr. 2014, 
https://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/step-twin-peaks-model-financial-analysis-496770. 
84 We have previously discussed Treasury’s Blueprint.  Interestingly, the GAO was looking at reform of 
the U.S. financial regulatory structure well before the global crisis.  See GAO, FINANCIAL REGULATION: 
INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2004), 
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-61.  
85 See Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998 No. 50 (1998), 
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2014C00106/Html/Text#_Toc381004899. 
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administration.”86  This is hardly an inspiring vision statement for the Authority.  
The Act contains what looks like an objectives-based requirement to “balance the 
objectives of financial safety and efficiency, competition, contestability and 
competitive neutrality and, in balancing these objectives, . . . promote financial 
system stability in Australia.”87  Yet, the existence of these abstract and multiple 
regulatory objectives would make derived rulemaking (based on article 8(2)) 
extremely difficult.  In other words, one could hardly imagine the Authority 
promulgating a rule about the central clearance of derivative transactions based on 
the authority of the singular and concrete mandate derived from article 8(2).  Yet, if 
we must point to one article in the Act as the objectives-based legislative mandate 
for the Authority’s function, article 8(2) of the Prudential Regulation Authority Act 
would provide the natural candidate.88  
The UK’s Financial Services Act could not provide a starker contrast to the 
way legislation defines objectives, rather than organizations and their processes.  
Figure 10 shows the objectives defined in various parts of the UK 2009 Banking 
Act.89  Objectives appear scattered across various parts of the Act.  In the case of 
special resolution regimes, the Act outlines the objectives—leaving the Treasury to 
issue a Code of Practice.90  In the case of bank insolvency, the Act provides 
liquidators with general powers, which they use to achieve their objectives.91  With 
regard to bank administration, the Act makes plain that “a bank administrator may 
do anything necessary or expedient for the pursuit of the Objectives.”92  
 
Figure 10: The UK’s Legislative Design of Objectives-Based Twin Peaks 
Regulatory Structure: The Financial Conduct Authority 
 
Part I: Special Resolution 
Regime 
Objectives and Code 4. Special Resolution 
Objectives 
 
The Act provides the UK’s Treasury, Financial Services Authority, and Bank of 
England with stabilisation powers, use of bank insolvency procedures, or bank 
administration procedures to (in no particular order):  
• Protect and enhance the stability of the UK’s financial systems (objective 1) 
• Protect and enhance public confidence in the stability of the banking systems of 
the United Kingdom (objective 2) 
• Protect depositors (objective 3) 
• Protect public funds (objective 4) and 
 
86 Id. at 8(1) (alteration in original). 
87 Id. at 8(2).  
88 We could have done the same analysis for the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act.  
In order to keep our paper at a readable length, we will focus our discussion mostly on prudential regulatory 
legislative provisions rather than business conduct ones.  See Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act 2001 No. 51 (2001), https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2013C00002.  
89 See Banking Act c.1 (2009), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/1/contents. 
90 Id. at 5.  
91 Id. at 75–76.  
92 Id. at 108.  
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• Avoid interfering with property rights in contravention of a Human Rights Act 
convention right  (objective 5). 
The order in which the objectives are listed in this section is not significant; they are 
to be balanced as appropriate in each case. 
Part II: Bank 
Insolvency 
Process of Bank 
Liquidation   
99. Objectives 
 
Bank liquidators should pursue two objectives (with objective 1 taking precedence 
over objective 2): 
• Work with the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to ensure that eligible 
depositors either have their accounts moved to another financial institution or 
receive payment from the Scheme (objective 1) 
• Wind up the bank’s affairs for the greatest benefit of the bank's creditors 
(objective 2). 
Part 3 Bank 
Administration 
Introduction 137-140. Objectives 
 
The Act provides bank administrators with two objectives (with the first 
objective taking priority),  
• Provide support for commercial purchaser or bridge bank (objective 1), and  
• Provide “normal” administration (objective 2). 
If the purchaser or “normal” administration is no longer required, these 
objectives cease to exist.  
Part 5 Inter-Bank 
Payment Systems 
 
Regulation 
 
188. Principles 
The Bank of England may publish–after receiving the Treasury’s okay–any 
principles it deems appropriate.  
The figure provides a plain English explanation of the legislation, omitting 
original formatting.  See original for exact measures and specific language.  
Source: UK 2009 Banking Act   
 
The organic provisions governing the UK’s Twin Peaks regulators also revolve 
around defining objectives—leaving the new organizations to define their own 
rules.  Figure 11 shows an example of legislation creating the UK’s Financial 
Conduct Authority (though we could have presented the Prudential Regulatory 
Authority without any change in the tenor of our analysis).93  As shown, the Act 
outlines three objectives (sections 1C-1E).  The Act further devolves rulemaking 
authority to the Financial Conduct Authority (in section 1K).  Rather than defining 
the Authority’s powers and processes in a detailed manner, the Act authorizes a 
number of panels to oversee the Authority’s work (sections 1N-1Q).  The Act thus 
 
93 See Financial Services Act 2012 c.21, Part 2, at 6 (amending sections 1 to 18 of the Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000 as part 1A Chapter 1), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/21/part/2/crossheading/financial-conduct-authority-and-prudential-
regulation-authority/enacted. 
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uses ex-post evaluation—rather than ex-ante rulemaking—as the main way of 
regulating the regulator.  
 
Figure 11: The UK’s Legislative Design of Objectives-Based Twin Peaks 
Regulatory Structure: The Financial Conduct Authority 
 
Provision Location 
Overview  
1. defines overall objective “ensuring that the relevant 
markets function well”    
2. provides requirement to uphold the “strategic objectives” 
defined in the Act 
3. gives authority to engage in rulemaking needed to ensure 
fulfilment of objective 
 
1B 
Consumer Protection Objective  
Defines an 8 part list of principles which the Authority 
should keep in mind when regulating) 
1C 
Integrity Objective 
Defines 5 part inclusive list of characteristics defining 
integrity of the “UK financial system” 
1D 
Competition Objective 
sets out a 5 part criteria for assessing “effective competition 
in the interests of “financial consumers” 
1E 
Definitions which define Authority’s jurisdiction 1F-1I 
Power to Amend Objectives 
Treasury may amend 
1J 
Rulemaking authority 1K 
Duty to engage in supervision 1L 
Duty to Consult 1M 
Authority Oversight 
Defines a group of panels that oversee the Authority’s work  
1N-Q 
Right to Conduct Market Review 1S 
Authority to Obtain Documents Needed for Reviews 1T 
  
The figure provides a paraphrasing of the provisions of the relevant sections of the 
2012 Financial Services Act (Part 2 amending the Financial Services and Markets 
Act of 2000).  The reader should consult the original text for authoritative text.  
 
Objectives-based legislation thus sets general objectives (tied to risks) and 
allows regulators to adopt rules which achieve those objectives.94  As if to belabour 
 
94 Omarova and Feibelman represent perhaps some of the most avid proponents of designing a financial 
sector regulatory structure around objectives.  At the risk of over-interpreting their proposal, they suggest 
starting from a clean slate–first deciding on regulatory objectives and then designing regulatory agencies 
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the point, Figure 12 summarizes our presentation of several pieces of the UK’s 
objectives-based financial sector legislation in graphical form.  The legislation 
focuses on risks identified by regulators and the public during the legislative 
process.95  Besides initial identification of risks by government agencies, like 
Treasury, business and civil society groups have their say on the risks and 
objectives targeted by the Twin Peaks legislation.96  In the Banking Act, various 
policy areas have their own objectives (defined in different parts of the Act).  In the 
case of the Financial Services Act, the section outlining the Financial Conduct 
Authority places all the objectives up front.  In each case, the relevant executive (or 
public sector) agencies charged with obtaining the objectives receive authority to 
engage in delegated legislation.  As we will see in the upcoming sections, 
administrative agencies often further devolve rulemaking—in the form of risk-based 
or principles-based regulation—on financial institutions directly.  
 
 
around those objectives.  See Saule Omarova & Adam Feibelman, Risks, Rules, and Institutions: A Process for 
Reforming Financial Regulation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 881 (2009). 
95 Some of these can be seen in preliminary documents leading up to the passage of the Financial 
Services Act.  See UK TREASURY, TREASURY - TWENTY-SIXTH REPORT, FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY 
(2012), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtreasy/1574/157402.htm.  See also 
TREASURY, TREASURY - TWENTY-EIGHTH REPORT: FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY: REPORT ON THE 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE (2012), 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtreasy/1857/185702.htm. 
96 In the case of the establishment of the Financial Conduct Authority, the House of Commons heard 
testimony from almost seventy persons and organizations–including names like the City of London 
Corporation, AXA UK, Financial Services Practitioner Panel, Aviva, and others.  
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One attraction of objectives-based legislation lay in the ability to devolve 
responsibility for achieving the objectives to industry in the form of principles-
based regulation.97  Objectives-based legislation would obviously provide the 
objectives for use in principles-based regulation.98  Figure 13 shows how objectives 
(as enshrined in the UK’s principles-based regulation) translate into outcomes—and 
how financial institutions—like Lloyds Banking Group (“Lloyds”)—translate these 
outcomes into their own principles.99  In this particular example, the Financial 
Services Authority’s Business Principles led to the publication of a guidance 
document for use by UK financial institutions.100  This provides further guidance for 
the general objectives set out by the regulator.  Each financial institution responds to 
the regulators’ objectives and principles in their own internal policies.  We show the 
five “pillars” (or objectives) that Lloyds used to translate national regulatory 
objectives into its own specific objectives (and specific policies, which we do not 
show in the figure).101  Objectives “cascade” from national regulator to financial 
institution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 Authors like Ford have argued principles-based regulation represents a new governance paradigm.  
Indeed, objectives-based legislation may represent the same new governance paradigm at the legislative level 
that principles-based regulation provides at the rulemaking level.  See Cristie Ford, New Governance, 
Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L. J. 1 (2008), 
http://www.cccucuta.org.co/uploads_descarga/desc_725679340f90dc19a918613be1317850.pdf. 
98 Professor Di Lorenzo argues that regulations must have “legislative congruence” in order to comply 
with the statute’s dictates while achieving the objectives that legislators sought in the first place.  Naturally, 
any system that just “passes on” objectives from legislators’ podiums to regulators desks (or directly passes 
objectives from the statute to the rulebook) achieves such congruence more efficiently.  See Vincent Di 
Lorenzo, Principles-Based Regulation and Legislative Congruence, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 45 
(2012). 
99 Unsurprisingly, the simple illustration we provide grossly simplifies the way regulations (and 
particularly principles-based regulations) promulgate through the financial system.  Black discusses the 
various channels used while Cunningham even questions the use of the term “principles-based” as a valid 
description.  See Julia Black, The Rise, Fall and Fate of Principles Based Regulation, LSE LEG. STUD. 
WORKING PAPERS 17/2010 (2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1712862; Lawrence 
Cunningham, Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of Principles-Based Systems in Corporate Law, Securities 
Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1409 (2007).  
100 See FSA, PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION: FOCUSING ON THE OUTCOMES THAT MATTER (2007), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/old-fsa-website; FSA, TREATING CUSTOMERS FAIRLY – TOWARDS FAIR OUTCOMES 
FOR CONSUMERS (2006), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/archive/fsa-tcf-towards.pdf.  We refer to FSA 
rulemaking, as the Financial Services Authority did not just disappear overnight when the UK’s Twin Peaks 
regulators appeared.  
101 See Lloyds Banking Group, Code of Personal Responsibility (2013), 
https://www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/globalassets/documents/our-group/responsibility/policies-and-
codes/code_of_personal_responsibility.pdf. 
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FSA’s Eleven Commandments
Act with integrity
Act with due skill, care and diligence
Organise and control affairs responsibly, 
wtih adequate risk management
Maintain adequate financial resources
Observe proper standards of market conduct
Treat customers fairly
Communicate clearly and honestly with clients
Figure 13: From Principal to Outcome in the 
Defunct Financial Services Authority Regulatory Regime
Manage conflicts of interest fairly
Ensure suitability of advice
Protect clients’ assets
Co-operate with regulators
Source: paraphrased from FSA (2007), FSA (2006) and Lloyds Banking Group (2013). 
Outcome 1: Fair treatment central to bank’s corporate culture.
Outcome 2: Products and services marketed actually meet  
customers’ needs
Outcome 3: Consumers given clear information before, during   
and after sale.
Outcome 4: Consumers receive suitable advice
Outcome 5: Consumers given expected level of  
performance/quality.
Outcome 6: Consumers do not experience extreme switching 
costs or costs to complain
Lloyds Five Pillars
1. Put customers at the heart of business.
2. Be a great company to work for
3. Work responsibly with external stakeholders.
4. Invest in communities 
5. Reduce environmental impact.
 
Principles-based financial sector regulator has its proponents and detractors.  
Many authors note that principles-based regulation (if supported better by 
regulatory enforcement) could have mitigated some of the worst parts of the 2007–
08 crisis.  Ford, in her analysis of the UK’s principles-based regulation, argues that 
inadequate enforcement—rather than the nature of principles-based regulation in 
itself—led to inadequate regulator responses to the crisis.102  Yet others note that the 
UK’s controversial experience with principles-based financial sector regulation 
provides some lessons for other countries—like Hong Kong.  The biggest criticism 
of principles-based regulation comes from the uncertain responses companies had in 
implementing the new rules.103  An equally valid critique has been that principles-
based regulation has coincided with “light touch” regulation.104  To sum up the 
prevailing view from the literature, principles-based regulation thus trades 
regulatory simplicity for decreased certainty about what the regulator will accept 
ex-post as financial institutions’ response to regulation.105  
 
102 Cristie Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis, 
MCGILL L. J. 55 (2010), https://works.bepress.com/cristie_ford/2/. 
103 Authors like Conceicao and Gray warned that companies might have difficulty drafting internal rules 
based on abstract principles.  They were right.  See Carlos Conceicao and Rosalind Gray, Problems of 
Uncertainty - The FSA Cannot Underestimate the Risk of Fewer Rules Creating More Fear and Less 
Innovation, 26 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 42 (2007).  
104 See Julia Black, Forms and Paradoxes of Principles-Based Regulation, 3 CAP. MAR. L. J. 4 (2008).  
For the media’s analysis of the confusion between principled-based and light-touch regulation, see Harry 
Wilson, Hector Sants Calls Time on FSA's 'Light Touch' Regulation, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 12, 2010), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/7431645/Hector-Sants-calls-time-on-
FSAs-light-touch-regulation.html. 
105 To continue with our example from Lloyds Banking Group, the recent fines for treating customers 
unfairly shows how banks can see and implement regulators’ controls, but misjudge whether they have reacted 
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The literature suggests two things about the way that objectives-based financial 
sector legislation would translate into regulations and thus financial institutions’ 
internal policies.  First, objectives-based legislation—and attendant principles-based 
regulation—could allow for a greater regulatory focus on risks.  Clearly, more and 
tighter regulations should govern areas of financial sector activity with higher 
risks—leaving less risky areas relatively under-regulated.106  By focusing on 
objectives rather than on processes, financial institutions can spend more time and 
energy drafting complex internal regulations controlling complex risks—leaving 
less risky areas with fewer (lighter) rules.  Second, such policies would shift 
competencies for financial section regulation directly onto financial institutions—
increasing costs as well as risks.107  Allowing banks and broker-dealers to regulate 
themselves (self-regulation) seems counterproductive.  However, as shown in 
Figure 14, the cost and benefits of such an approach will depend on a number of 
variables.  Depending on the values of the variables described in the figure, either a 
rules-based or principles-based approach will work better.  The best system depends 
on the country in question.  
 
Figure 14: Factors affecting whether an objectives-based financial sector 
legislation and regulation would outperform a rules-based approach 
variable  way variable affects objectives-based legislation 
Number of 
government 
regulators needed  
As the number of regulators rises, their cost increases, 
making the country’s regulatory regime more expensive.  
Moreover, the taxes raised to pay their salaries may reduce 
financial sector and overall economic growth.   
Relative efficiency of 
government versus 
banks’ legal 
departments and 
economics 
department staff  
 
 
Nothing requires regulators to have superior abilities 
to draft regulations based on legislation and analyse 
regulatory impacts better than in-house counsel and 
economists.  Bank-based analysts (if they have long time-
horizons) have stronger personal financial incentives to 
strike the right balance between prudence and profit.  
 
correctly.  Lloyds put in place incentive schemes designed to increase sales which the FCA thought, “led to a 
serious risk that sales staff were put under pressure to hit targets to get a bonus or avoid being demoted, rather 
than focus on what consumers may need or want.”  See FCA, FCA Fines Lloyds Banking Group Firms a Total 
of £28,038,800 for Serious Sales Incentive Failings (Dec. 11, 2013), https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-
releases/fca-fines-lloyds-banking-group-firms-total-£28038800-serious-sales-incentive. 
106 For a review of the promises of risk-based regulation (and a review from several jurisdictions), see  
Julia Black, The Development of Risk Based Regulation in Financial Services: Canada, the UK and 
Australia (2004), http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/staff publications full text/black/risk based regulation in 
financial services.pdf.  
107 Regulators using financial institutions to regulate for them represents a way to leverage public 
resources—which in the private sector context is called “leveraging off the client.”  Authors like Omarova see 
strong incentives for financial firms to create optimal self-regulation that minimises systemic risks.  See Saule 
Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 
411 (2011).  Authors like Helm are not convinced.  See Dieter Helm, Regulatory Reform, Capture, and the 
Regulatory Burden, 22 OXF. REV. ECON. POL. 2 (2013).  
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Cooperation 
between compliance 
departments  
Cooperation—through a national banking association 
for example—can ensure financial institutions’ in-house 
counsel and economists do not create institution-specific 
rules from scratch.  By communicating, they can agree on 
fundamental provisions in all financial institutions’ 
policies.  Naturally, free-riding and collective action 
problems may make the costs of such cooperation exceed 
the benefits.  
 
Relative asymmetry 
of shocks between 
financial institutions 
To the extent that financial institutions require 
differing responses to shocks (for example one bank will 
suffer more than others from a change in interest rates), 
delegated rule-making may allow them to better tailor a 
response.  
 
Reduction in profits 
from rules 
McKinsey estimates that return on equity from banks 
will fall from 20% to 7% due to lower profits and 
quantities traded from new financial sector regulations.108 
The more firms can tailor their own rules, the less this 
damage from excess rulemaking.  
 
Marginal change in 
financial 
institutions’ staff 
time dealing with 
compliance rather 
than policy writing 
Financial institutions will need to adjust their 
policies, no matter which regulatory approach used.  If 
these institutions need about the same amount of time to 
create substantive rules as to simple adopt policies to 
comply with prescriptive rules, then companies should just 
write these substantive rules for themselves.  
 
Relative 
effectiveness of self-
written rules on 
reducing the 
probability of 
financial distress 
The benefits of regulator-written rules versus industry 
(or company) written rules depends on whose rules 
provide better protection against systemic and other risks 
(while offering the possibility of profit).  If financial 
institutions write better rules, then clearly they should have 
self-regulatory powers.   
 
Relative monitoring 
and punishment 
costs under 
principles-based vs. 
rules-based regime 
      Rules control risks only if financial institutions follow 
them.  If financial institutions can ignore regulators’ rules 
(due to low detection probabilities or penalties), self-
regulation of a principles-based system could provide 
superior results. 
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The figure shows the factors that would determine whether the costs and benefits of 
a government regulator promulgating specific financial sector rules would exceed 
those of a decentralized approach (with firms deciding specific policies that comply 
with general objectives).  We do not show the actual equation(s) in order to keep the 
paper readable for a general audience.  We do not show concrete results (using 
simulation or regression analysis) due to lack of data.  We assume that government 
regulators and professionals working in financial firms earn the same salaries. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we argued that objectives-based legislation may help solve some 
difficult executive agency organizational problems which have stumped legal, 
public administration, and economics scholars.  Objectives-based regulation could 
change the way lawmakers and regulators see the role of law in implementing 
government policies.  When tackling complex risks (like security or financial 
stability), lawmakers passed a range of legislation with competencies and 
obligations assigned to a range of government agencies.  Recent legal scholarship 
around the objectives-based Twin Peaks financial regulation challenges the usual 
view of legislating.  Such legislating sets out social (financial) risks, defines 
particular statutory objectives and creates executive agencies to achieve those 
objectives.  Such an approach promises to reduce the complex and sometimes 
ineffective inter-agency collaborations which bedevil public administration. 
 
 
 
 
